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Contract Farming and Capital Accumulation in Cameroon:
The Case of the CDC Smallholder Scheines
Piet Konings
In several post-colonial states, there has been a shift from
plantation productiori to smallholder production. This is vividly
illustrated in Kenya, where the area under smallholder tea increased by
about 250 per cent during the 1970s, while the area under tea on the
estates exhibited only a slight increase (cf. Swainson, 1985). This shift is
quite remarkable, for it has often been assumed that large-scale,
"modem" estates were more likely to meet the imperatives of increased
output and capital accumulation than supposedly "archaic" and less
productive peasant agriculture. One of the main reasons for this shift
seems to be the growing number of predominantly foreign-dominated
agro-industrial enterprises determined to withdraw from plantation
production. Confronted in the newly independent states by difficulties
regarding the ownership of land and problems in recruiting and
controlling an increasingly costly labour force, they abandon their risky
plantation operations and concentrate instead on potentially more
lucrative activities like supplying technical, managerial and marketing
skills to produce, process and seil plantation products (cf. Kirk, 1987;
Konings, f.c.). Consequently, they often opt for contract farming
schemes as an attractive alternative to plantation production (cf. Glover,
1984; Goldsmith, 1985; Clapp, 1988).
Contract farming is a system of agricultural production whereby
smallholders or "outgrowers" are obliged to supply produce to agro-
industrial enterprises in accordance with conditions specified in a
written or oral contract, ïn return, the enterprises supply inputs, credit
and technical advice, and engage in processing and marketing (cf.
Minot, 1986). A growing number of Third World governments and
international financial institutions like the World Bank actively support
these schemes, which they feel promote the local peasants' Integration
into the capitalist system and the necessary increase in their productivity
and Standard of living (cf. Payer, 1979; Williams, 1981).
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Cameroon seems to constitute a notable exception to this current
trend. Ever since the end of the sixties, the Cameroonian post-colonial
state has mainly focused on the expansion of large-scale and, of late,
middle-sized plantations. Various reasons have been advanced to explain
this policy, in particular the political elite's persistent anti-peasant bias
and its vested interests in plantation production: the expansion of
plantation production seems to provide the elite with new opportunities
for private capital accumulation in the form of appointments to the
highly paid top functions in the established agro-industrial parastatals or
privileged access to public subsidies and credit reserved for the new
"Exploitations Agricoles de Moyenne Importance" (EAMI)scheme (cf.
Courade, 1984; Tchala Abina, 1989; Konings, f.c.; and Jua in this
volume). Obviously, these explanations are excessively deterministic,
for they tend to ignore the fact that the post-colonial state has never
neglected the "encadrement" of the peasantry altogether. Nevertheless,
there is no doubt that the government has devoted very little attention to
setting up contract farming schemes associated with the established
agro-industrial enterprises. It was only in 1977/78 that it ordered two of
its agro-industrial parastatals, the Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC) and Socapalm, to develop 2,000 ha of smallholder rubber and oü
palms each (cf. Konings, 1986a; Van de Belt, 1981). A third parastatal,
Hevecam, was requested in 1979 to include trials of 250 ha of
smallholder rubber in its second development programme (1979-1985).
These schemes were implemented under pressure from the international
financiers of agro-industrial expansion in Cameroon, particularly the
World Bank.
There are widely differing views on the development potential of
contract farming schemes. Authors writing from a modernization
perspective tend to be quite optimistic. They look upon contract farming
as a significant trajectory of capital accumulation in the rural areas,
which effectively combines the agro-industry's management capacity,
capital resources, modern technology, and marketing facilities with the
smallholders' control over land and labour (cf. Morrissy, 1974;
Kusterer, 1981; Williams and Karen, 1984). Morrissy (1974) held that
contract farming could lead to the development of a stable and
politically conservative class of well-to-do farmers in the rural areas.
Authors writing from a dependency perspective tend to be far more
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pessimistic. They look upon contract farming as one of those "evil"
schemes devised by foreign capital and a comprador elite, which
inevitably result in a deepening dependency of Third World countries
on the capitalist "core" and the increasing exploitation and immiseration
of the rural poor (cf. Feder, 1977; Lappé and Collins, 1977; Dinham
and Hines, 1983). A number of researchers who studied contract
farming schemes in Kenya attempted to create a kind of synthesis
between the modernization and dependency perspectives (cf. Buch-
Hansen and Marcussen, 1982; Cowen, 1981; Currie and Ray, 1986).
They held that contract farming could give rise to a growing
subsumption of the peasantry to capital and state, and still produce the
conditions for the emergence of either a rieh or a middle peasantry.
These conflicting views might be useful for the evaluation of
contract farming schemes, but also have serious shortcomings. First of
all, they tend to concentrate on the relations of exchange between the
two parties, and often ignore the process of production itself. This
largely explains why they fail to address one of the most essential pre-
conditions for capital accumulation in contract farming schemes: the
establishment of managerial control over the labour process. Agro-
industrial enterprises try to procure a reliable supply of high-quality
and relatively cheap agricultural commodities. This objective is not
likely to be achieved unless management is capable of gaining control
over the processes of both production and exchange. And secondly,
these views tend to treat smallholders as passive victims or beneficiaries
of the actions of capital and state, often denying them an active role in
shaping their own destiny. As will be noted below, smallholders have
frequently resorted to informal and collective actions to protest against
their Subordination and exploitation (cf. Crisp, 1984; Konings, f.c.).
I like to review here the contract farming schemes attached to the
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). The Corporation was
established in 1946/47, but its roots can be traced back to the German
colonial period (1884-1914). During.German rule, a considerable
number of large-scale private plantations were established, especially on
the fertile volcanic soil around Mount Cameroon in the present South
West Province. The original residents, mainly the Bakweri, were then
expelled to prescribed restricted native reservations (cf. Epale, 1985).
The area was occupied by British forces at the beginning of the First
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World War. Interestingly, following this conquest, a protracted debate
took place within British administrative circles on the future of the ex-
German plantations: the principal question was whether to retain the
estates or return the plantation lands to the original owners. Hearing that
the major assets of the territory, the plantations, would be lost if they
were handed over to the Bakweri, the British authorities eventually
decided to keep them. After the First World War, most of the estates
were bought by the former German owners. After the Second World
War, the majority of the expropriated German plantations were
transferred to a newly created public enterprise, the CDC, which was
charged with developing and running the estates for the benefit of the
whole territory (cf. Molua, 1985; Konings, f.c.; Clarence-Smith in this
volume). From the start, the CDC became the largest agro-industrial
enterprise in the country. At present, it has about 40,000 ha under
cultivation and keeps about 60,000 ha in reserve for future expansion. It
has obtained huge loans for estate development from a number of
international financial institutions, including the World Bank. It owns
twenty-one estates, each of which produces one of the corporation's
main crops: rubber, oil palms, tea, and bananas. And finally, it employs
about 15,000 permanent workers and about 1,500 seasonal and casual
workers (cf. Konings, 1989a).
A case study of the CDC contract farming schemes is of particular
interest, since the CDC is one of the exceptional (plantation-based) agro-
industrial enterprises in Cameroon to have had lengthy experience with
various forms of contract farming1. In 1968, it was transformed by the
government into a "development Corporation" (Tchala Abina, 1989) and
charged with the responsibility of "assisting smallholders or groups of
them engaged in the cultivation of crops similar to those cultivated by
itself in the collection area of the milis it manages"2. In his study, we
want to examine whether the variety of CDC smallholders' schemes
have given rise to increased output and capital accumulation as well as
to the emergence of a class of rieh or middle peasants. This evaluation
effort is divided into two periods: (i) the period of contract farming
preceding the World Bank scheme (1946/47-1977/78) and (ii) the
1 The Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd, a Unilever subsidiary, is another example.
2
 See law no. 68/LF/9 of 11 June 1968.
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period from the implementation of the World Bank scheme to 1987
(1977/78-1986/87).
The CDC and Smallholder Development in 1946/47-1977/78
The first attempt to plan and implement a smallholders' scheme
attached to the CDC was made soon after the corporation's foundation
in 1946/47. This attempt was closely related to the Bakweri land
problem. Following the British Trusteeship Authority's lease of the ex-
German plantation lands to the newly created CDC, the Bakweri elite,
organised into the Bakweri Land Committee, appealed to the United
Nations Trusteeship Council to annul this decision. In several petitions it
complained bitterly about the continuing suffering of the Bakweri
people due to the loss of their ancestral lands (cf. Molua, 1985). In
reaction to this Bakweri protest, the British administration asked Mr.
W.M. Bridges, a Senior District Officer well acquainted with Bakweri
society, to carry out an intensive investigation of the Bakweri land
problem and to recommend appropriate solutions. Mr Bridges starled
his investigation in 1948 on the assumption that 15 acres of land would
be fully adequate for each Bakweri household. In the end, hè came to
the conclusion that 25,000 acres of CDC land would satisfy the Bakweri
requirements. He proposed that this land be used for the cultivation of
food crops on a controlled tenancy basis and that the CDC provide
technical advice, social welfare services, and market facilities for
approved crops. However, since the Bakweri Land Committee refused
to cooperate with the government and the CDC management until the
Bakweri claims on CDC lands had been recognized, his proposals were
never implemented3.
Another attempt followed the expansion of local banana
production at the beginning of the fifties. This time the effort proved
more successful. Particular credit for this success should be given to Dr.
E.M.L. Endeley, one of the outstanding Bakweri and nationalist leaders
and a member of the CDC Board of Directors at the time (cf. Chiabi,
1982). After initial Opposition, he was eventually able to enlist the
3
 See BNA, file Qf/e (1946)1, Bakweri Land Committee and BNA, file Qf/e (1951)1,
Examination of Petitions from the Bakweri Land Committee.
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support of the govemment and the CDC management for a bold plan
promoting the commercialization of peasant banana production. To this
end, hè founded the Bakweri Co-operative Union of Farmers (BCUF) in
1952 and concluded a market agreement with the CDC management (cf.
Ardener, 1958; Epale, 1978). Under the terms of this agreement, the
CDC was prohibited from making profits on its transactions with the
BCUF though it was permitted to recover handling charges from the co-
operative. The Corporation marketed the BCUFs produce from 1952 to
1957, when it had to hand over the business to Elders and Fyffes after
proving incapable of handling the growing amounts (cf. Heinzen, 1984).
During this period, the scheme gave rise to rapid capital accumulation
among the Bakweri banana producers. It proved without any doubt that
the Bakweri peasant was capable of increasing production and
undertaking entrepreneurial activities if given the right incentive and
assistance (cf. Courade, 1981/82; Ardener, 1970; and Geschiere, 1988).
A renewed attempt was made after the achievement of
independence and reunification in 1960/61. In 1964, the CDC
management invited a mission from the Commonwealth Development
Corporation headed by Mr R.J.M. Swynnerton to draft a long-term
development plan for the corporation. In its report, the mission advised
the corporation to set up a variety of rubber, oil palm, and tea
smallholder schemes and to extend its role in smallholder development
from exchange to production: the regulär supply of inputs, credit, and
technical advice as well as strict supervision of the labour process (cf.
Epale 1985: 183-185). It also recommended the Installation of a
Smallholder Development Authority by the Federated State of West
Cameroon, which would be responsible for the planning and
implementation of smallholders' schemes in the territory. lts arguments
for smallholder development sound familiär to anybody acquainted with
the modernization theory on contract farming:
"CDC and the govemment would thus promote the development of
land at present unused and would create a type of middle-class
farmer growing crops and eaming incomes at a level well above
the general one in West Cameroon. This should serve as an
incentive to the numerous peasants whose farming is at present
relatively unproductive4".
4
 Swynnerton et al. ,1964: 37.
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Apparently, it preferred to recruit scheme participants from the
more privileged sections of the rural population: "selection of settlers
should be based on their being married men, preferably having had
some education and some previous experience with the erop grown and
having some initial capital"3.
During the 1964-1968 period, representatives of the CDC
management and the West Cameroonian govemment regularly discussed
the Swynnerton Mission recommendations. However, none of the
proposed projects were ever implemented, nor was a Smallholder
Development Authority installed. One of the main reasons for this
failure was the frequent discrepancy between rhetoric and practice:
though the federal govemment regularly expressed its commitment to
smallholder development, in the end it proved unwilling to actively
support the proposed schemes. As a matter of fact, by that time it had
already become more interested in the expansion of agro-industrial
estate production.
It is, however, interesting to observe that notwithstanding the
indefinite postponement of the Swynnerton proposals, the CDC became
increasingly involved in smallholder development. By 1967/68 its
assistance was requested for an oil palm and rubber smallholder scheme
initiated by the producers themselves. This scheme had come into
existence during the rapid decline of banana production after the
achievement of independence and reunification (cf. Bederman, 1971).
On the BCUFs advice, a number of banana growers then started to
diversify production and invest their accumulated capital in crops like
rubber and oil palms. They hardly received any advice on the
cultivation of these crops. Some govemment departments in West
Cameroon were very helpful, in particular the Departments of
Agriculture and Co-operatives. When some of the established oil palm
and rubber farms reached maturity by 1967/68, these departments
arrived at an agreement with the CDC management that the corporation
would transport, process and market the smallholders' produce.
The large majority of these smallholders were peasants who grew
oil palms and rubber in addition to other crops. Their holdings tended
to be quite small: the approximately 3,000 members of the South West
5
 Ibid., p. 54.
224 ITINÉRAIRES D'ACCUMULATION AU CAMEROUN
Province Oil Palm Smallholders' Co-operative did not cultivate more
than an estimated total area of 4,000 ha6. They mainly made use of
family labour; however, for heavy farm work like land development,
they might either call upon co-operative groups or employ casual
labour. Their farms were scattered throughout the South West
Province. It was, as the CDC management never ceased to note,
expensive and time-consuming to give them any effective assistance in
the form of inputs, technical advice and transport.
Besides these small producers, there was a tiny minority of larger
producers. They owned farms usually varying from about 10 to 150 ha.
The largest producers were from the various fractions of the
Anglophone elite: the group included well known politicians, chiefs, top
civil servants, CDC managers and directors and businessmen such as Dr.
E.M.L. Endeley, Mr. E.K. Martin, Mr. E.A. Mbiwan, Nfon V. Mukete,
and Chief S.O. Ebanja. They tended to be absentee farmers, leaving the
actual running of their farms to farm managers, usually their own sons.
They employed permanent and casual workers, the actual number
depending on the size of the farm. Generally speaking, they tended to
maintain their farms better than the small producers and to seil higher
quality produce to the CDC milis.
The relations between the larger and smaller producers were not
always without conflict. With the aid of the traditional authorities and
the state, the larger producers managed to appropriate vast lands in
areas suitable for oil palm production, at the expense of the local
peasantry. One famous case occurred in 1966, when Mr. E.A. Mbiwan,
the former General Manager of the West Cameroon Electricity
Corporation, acquired a vast area of land at Batoke, a village along the
West Coast, from the Victoria Traditional Council. In 1968, peasant
cultivators were driven from this land by Mr. Mbiwan's workers.
Notwithstanding relentless peasant protest, Mr. Mbiwan starled to
establish his Bonanza Estate on this land, where hè grew several crops
including 135 ha of oil palms7. Nevertheless, these internal
6
 See Petition of the South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders' Co-operative,
Victoria, to Minister of Commercial and Industrial Development, dated 12 January
1975, in: file MINEP/ED/SWP/A/554, Small Palm Kolders Scheme.
7
 See Petition of Strangers of Batoke, Native West Coast, to the Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Lands and Survey, Buea, dated 6 June 1968, in: BNA, file Qd/a (1969)1,
Surrender of Land by CDC at Bakingili.
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contradictions were often obscured by the Smallholders' common
interests: more assistance and, above all, a higher producer price from
the Corporation.
From the very start of the scheme, there has been a serious
conflict between the producers and the CDC management about the
producer price. The larger and smaller producers constantly claimed
their incomes did not suffice to compensate them for increasing
production and transport costs. They expressed their dissatisfaction by
regularly resorting to collective and informal actions.
The South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders' Co-operative
wrote numerous petitions to the state and the CDC management to
protest against the low remuneration and appeal for an improvement. lts
leadership, usually recruited among the few large producers, appears to
have even been attacked for this form of protest.
Case no. 1. A Large Oil Palm Producer and Co-
operative Leader
Chief S.O. Ebanja served as a senior civil servant at the
Govemor's Office in Buea. At present, hè is the Paramount Chief
of the Balong living at Mukonje in the Meme Division. He owns
several farms. One of them is a 25 ha oil palm farm at Malende, a
Balong village near Muyuka in the Fako Division. This farm has
not been profitable so far. On the contrary, during the period
1971-1980, Chief Ebanja incurred a loss of almost one million
FCFA. He claims to have regularly been harassed by the CDC
management during his term of office as President of the South
West Province Oil Palm Smallholders' Co-operative for his bold
championship of the Smallholders' cause. The corporation has
seized part of his land, denied him transport facilities, and
regularly rejected his produce8.
The co-operative leaders tried to capitalize on their long-
established contacts within the regioftal state apparatus. When the
regional authorities were informed of the precarious Situation, they
tried to mediale on the Smallholders' behalf. However, the CDC
managemenl refused lo meet with their requests for negotiations wilh
8
 Sec letter from Ebanja and Sons, Malende, to the Chairman of the CDC, dated 9
March 1981, in: file MINEP/ED/SWP/A/554, Small Palm Kolders Scheme.
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the smallholders on the producer price. This is evident from the
following report drawn up by the economie adviser to the Govemor of
the South West Province in 1979:
"The Oil Palm Smallholders have long been fïghting with the CDC
about the price of their palm nuts, which they consider low. In
studying this problem, we often found they were justified and
pleaded with the CDC to review its stand. The price increases from
the CDC have been so small they never seemed to satisfy the
smallholders, who claim they can hardly break even. On the other
hand, the CDC has proved to be rather dictatorial, admitting no
dialogue whatsoever in its dealings, implying that the smallholders
either take it or leave it. Thus defeating the provisions whereby it
pledged to assist the small farmers around their plantations"9.
The CDC management continued to claim that its smallholder and
price policies were backed by the government and that it paid a fair
price to the producers. For example, during a meeting with the
Govemor of the South West Province on 7 July 1975, the CDC General
Manager, Mr. J.N. Ngu stated that
"the corporation had to operate in accordance with the terms
defined by the government. It had to co-operate with the
government's policy of smallholder development. Consequently, it
was not out to profil off the smallholders but to pay them the füll
value of their oil after deducting the necessary expenses. It had to
operate on commercial Unes and not to waste or lose money
unnecessarily. Therefore, it would not increase prices for the
smallholders unless it was economically feasible"10.
As soon as it became clear that the co-operative was unable to
defend their interests effectively, the smallholders resorted to a variety
of informal actions to protest against their low remuneration. They
neglected their farms, refused to make further Investments in
production, and often supplied low-quality produce to the corporation's
factories. Some of them stopped delivering produce to the corporation,
9 See Report of Dr (Mrs.) Teresia Elad, Economie Adviser to the Govemor of the
South West Province, on price paid to oil palm smallholders by CDC, dated 6 July
1979, in: ibid.
10 See Minutes of a Meeting held in the Govemor's Office, Buea, on 17 July 1975 to
discuss the price of palm fruits paid to smallholdeis, in: ibid.
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processing the palm fruits themselves in the traditional way and selling
the oil at the local markets. A few even withdrew completely from the
scheme. The CDC management, in turn, tended to interpret these actions
as evidence of the smallholders' lack of entrepreneurship and
unwillingness to follow its instructions conceming production and
exchange. That is why it decided to exclude these smallholders from
participation in a "new" scheme to be implemented within the
framework of a second large-scale development project of the
corporation, the CAMDEV II project (1978-1982) (cf. Konings, f.c.).
This "new" scheme was planned by the World Bank to strengthen
management control over the processes of production and exchange. It
should, however, be noted that the "old" scheme continued to operate
alongside this "new" scheme.
The CDC and Smallholder Development in 1977/78-1986/87
In its 1977 appraisal of the CAMDEV II project11, the World
Bank recommended a more active role of the corporation in
smallholder development. It advocated a smallholders' scheme based on
the Swynnerton Report's contract farming model, with considerable
managerial control over production and exchange. However, contrary
to the latter report, it insisted on focusing on the rural low-income
groups rather than the richer, "progressive" peasants.
It proposed that the corporation assist in setting up about 1,000 ha
of smallholder rubber and 1,000 ha of smallholder oil palms during the
CAMDEV H period (1978-1982). This programme was to be funded as
follows by the financiers of the CAMDEV II project: the Cameroonian
government was to contribute US $ 1,000,000 the World Bank US $
1,100,000, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the
Central Fund for Economie Cooperation both US $ 600,000.
Any candidate who wanted to join the scheme was requested to
sign a contract with the CDC12. This contract stipulated the conditions
1! World Bank, Cameroon: Appraisal of a Second CAMDEV Project, Report no.
1676-CM, Washington D.C., December 1977.
12 See CDC, Conditions of the contract governing relations between the CDC and the
smallholder plantation farmers; and CDC, Contract for smallholders oil palm/rubber
plantations.
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for participation and the mutual obligations of the contracting parties. It
aimed at correcting some of the shortcomings of the "old" scheme and
improving managerial control over production and exchange.
The most important conditions for participation were the
following. Candidates had to have the Cameroonian nationality and
derive at least 75% of their income from farming. They had to be
between 25 and 40 years old and physically fit to establish a farm;
however, older persons who had the labour power of young relatives at
their disposal could also qualify, Moreover, they had to own land that
met the conditions of the contract: it had to be within a radi.us of 30 kms
from a CDC oil mill or rubber factory, located less than 500 metres
from a road or track passable for CDC vehicles, suitable for either oil
palm or rubber cultivation, and covered by a land use right for at least
twenty-four years. And fmally, they had to have the corporation's
official approval for participation in the scheme.
The obligations of the two contracting parties were stipulated as
follows. The participants had to (i) punctually execute all the
instructions given by the CDC management in the labour process, (ii)
attend all the meetings convened by the CDC management for training
and farm management purposes, (iii) seil all their produce to the
Corporation, and (iv) settle "scrupulously" all their debts with the
Corporation. The CDC management, in turn, had to provide the
participants with the necessary inputs, technical advice and supervision.
These services were to be rendered on credit and had to be repaid in
increasing installments after the erop had started bearing. Repayment
was to be deducted from the sales to the Corporation. In addition, the
CDC management had to transport the participants1 output for a fixed
price to its factories and process it. Lastly, it was obliged to pay the
producers monthly for erop delivery.
The contract was concluded for a period of twenty-seven years as
from the year of the first clearing of the land. The ultimate sanction for
non-compliance with the terms of the contract was the seizure of the
farm. Following the repayment of all the debts, the participants were to
receive a land certificate registered in the Survey Department.
The participants were prohibited from developing more than l to
2 ha of land during the first year. The management assumed that this
would be the maximum they could handle satisfactorily. Depending on
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their performance, however, they might be encouraged later on to
expand to a total of 5 ha of oil palms or 4 ha of rubber. The World
Bank believed this scheme would help create a stable middle peasantry:
the amount of land to be cultivated with modem production techniques
would be sufficient to provide participants with a higher income than
non-parücipants and hence make them more liable to management
control. During the maturing period of the crops, the producers were to
receive a non-refundable cash grant of FCFA 56,900 for oil palms and
FCFA 108,106 for rubber, serving as a kind of remuneration for their
labour inputs13.
Compared to the "old" scheme, the "new" one would appear to be
a more promising effort on the part of the "development coalition"
(Bates, 1981) - the Cameroonian post-colonial state, international
finance capital, and the agro-industry - to incorporate the local
peasantry into the capitalist system and subsume it to the imperatives of
increased output and capital accumulation. It enables the CDC
management to greatly extend its control over both the means of
production and the processes of production and exchange. This, and
similar schemes make for a substantial loss of the peasantry's autonomy
and the virtual emergence of a peculiar form of proletarianization: they
tend to transform the producer into a kind of task worker for the agro-
industry on his "own" land (cf. Bernstein, 1979; Konings, 1986b).
Clapp (1988: 16) observes in this respect:
"Contract farming is a form of disguised proletarianization: it
secures the farmer's land and labour, while leaving him/her with
formal title to both. The control exercised by the company is
indirect but effective; the farmer's control is legal but illusory. In
this sense s/he is a "propertied labourer" - "on the one hand a
landlord, and on the other a labourer who cares for corporate
plants".
The "new" scheme seems to be otgreat benefit to the corporation.
It has an enormous potential for a regulär supply of agricultural
commodities to the corporation's oil milis and rubber factories at
relatively little cost. It transfers almost all the production costs to the
13 Cash grants have been revised by the project management over the years. For
example, the total cash grant for rubber cultivation had risen to FCFA 149,923 in 1985.
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producers, since the inputs and agricultural services are provided on
credit and have to be repaid with interest after erop delivery. In
addition, it exempts the Corporation from the bürden of controlling and
paying a large wage-labour force. Moreover, it shifts some of the
production risks to the producers, since they bear the brunt of poor
harvests and price fluctuations on the national and international markets.
Lastly, it enables management to present itself as a champion of regional
development and establish a group of local allies among the people
directly involved in smallholders' schemes (cf. Bates, 1981).
The management has always claimed that the "new" scheme would
benefit the producers as well. It usually emphasized that the scheme
would enable them to diversify production and obtain inputs, credit
facilities, technical advice, a guaranteed market, a regulär monthly
income all year round and, last but not least, a substantial improvement
in their living Standards. Wyrley-Birch et al. (1982: 90) estimated the
annual net income of participants in the oil palm scheme in 1982 at
about FCFA 250,000 per ha of fully mature oil palms. This compared
favourably with the wage levels of skilled and unskilled CDC workers
which they estimated at FCFA 240,000 and 180,000, and the average
peasant income of FCFA 100,000-150,000. If these estimates are
correct, any participant with a few ha of oil palms would be likely to
become a member of the middle peasantry.
By the end of 1978, the newly created Smallholders1 Department
at Tiko went into Operation. Fifty-two candidates were selected for
participation in the scheme (see Table 1) and then organised into
groups. The main aim of the grouping was to promote the kind of
mutual help and cooperation in arduous farm activities that was given in
"traditional" work groups. However, these groups were also hoped to
exercise control over their members. Each group was asked to elect a
president, a secretary and a treasurer.
Despite all the planning and organisational efforts, the scheme
never really got off the ground. lts performance during the CAMDEV
II period (1978-1982) failed to meet with the expectations. By 1982 it
had attracted only 378 participants and had not achieved its cultivation
targets: only 38.3% of the planned 1,000 ha of oil palms and 52.8% of
the planned 1,000 ha of rubber had been planted. Moreover, a large
Proportion of the cultivated area had not been properly maintained.
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These disappointing results can be attributed to a number of factors. We
shall mention here only the most important ones:
(a) Cultivation restrictions. For purposes of efficiency, the CDC
management was justified in restricting cultivation to land within a
radius of 30 kms from a CDC mill or factory and close to a passable
road, but its decision drastically reduced the area of cultivation. These
restrictions were even reinforced in 1982, when the CDC decided to
confine "passable roads" to tarred roads.
Table l
CDC Smallholders1 Development Scheme: Total Cultivated
Area, Participants, and Loans and Grants Supplied,
1978/79-1986/87
YEAR
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
TOTAL
CULTIVATED AREA
(HA)
oil palm
25
170
350
383
383
383
467
557
557
rubber
57
214
430
528
526
526
527
737 1
737 1
Total
82
384
780
911
909
909
994
,294
,294
NUMBER OF
SMALLHOLDERS
oil palm
15
101
143
147
187
187
rubber
37
136
190
224
245
245
Total
52
237
333
378
378
378
371
432
432
TOTAL GRANTS
AND LOANS
(FCFA)
11,851,785
37,656,609
60,631,644
21,572,000
19,000,000
26,000,000
7,500,000
9,700,000
17,000,000
210,912,038
Source: CDC Smallholders' Development Scheme, Annual Report:
Summary 1980/81 erop year, in: file MINEP/ED/SWP/A/554,
Small Palm Holders Scheme; CDC Annual Reports and
Accounts, 1978-1987.
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(b) Regulär delays in delivery of agricultural inputs. The usual cause of
these delays was that the Corporation gave priority treatment to its owrt
estates. To reduce its dependence on CDC supplies, the project
management decided to set up a small oil palm nursery at Tiko during
the 1983/84 erop year.
(c) Serious shortage of land. This is a direct consequence of the
presence of the CDC estates and the increasing settlement of immigrants
in the area. Land prices are, therefore, constantly on the rise: l ha of
land was sold in 1985/86 for about FCFA 250,000-350,000. As a result,
the scheme mainly attracted the segment of the rural population that was
privileged to own reserve lands or capital resources, rather than its
target group, the rural poor. This was substantiated by a survey I
carried out among the smallholders in the Balong area of the Muyuka
Subdivision in 1985/86. I noted that the large majority of scheme
participants were male heads of immigrant families (90%), in
65% from the Grassfields. This is not surprising, since these elders havé|
become the richest peasants in the area. Their almost exclusiveh
participation in the scheme has exacerbated the contradictions in the;
area. There is, first of all, the conflict between the Balong
immigrants about control over land. The Balong resent the large-scatf1
immigrant occupation of their ancestral lands. This has given rise ttj \
numerous disputes about land rights and serious confrontations betweetfj
the two groups. The Chief of Malende is one of the main leaders of th|f
local Opposition. As hè is simultaneously president of the Ie
smallholders' group, hè refused to supply land to some large Bamili
farmers for rubber cultivation and barred them from entering
scheme. I noted that some immigrants had joined the scheme witlt
view to settling and reinforcing their rights to land rather th«
developing oil palm and rubber farms. And secondly, there is
conflict between the elders and the younger people. The elders usu
do not allocate land to the young men and women who would like
join the scheme. They prefer to employ all the available house
members on their own rubber and oil palm farms. This is often
continuous source of friction, for the young men are anxious to earn i
income of their own and the women prefer to work on their food fat
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(cf. Carney, 1987). Some of the women were very annoyed when their
husbands started to create rubber farms on part of their food farms.
(d) Obstruction by local chiefs. Quite a few chiefs demanded large sums
Of money before signing the required land use certificates, even though
they knew very well that the applicants were land owners in their
villages. In 1978-1980, the scheme lost 80 potential candidates because
Of Ais bottleneck".
(e) Financial strains. All the interviewed smallholders complained that
"•ihe fïnancial assistance granted by the project management did not cover
costs of developing, maintaining and expanding their farms. The
;e majority (75%) hired labour from time to time. However, the
cash. grants they received did not suffice to compensate them for these
. They often had to invest their savings in the development and
sion of their farms or to raise loans.
;$) Relatively low producer price. Initially, the scheme attracted a
aber of peasants who expected high monthly incomes from rubber
oil palm cultivation. However, when the producer price remained
" below expectations, potential candidates became hesitant to join the
ie. Those who had already joined became frustrated, but found it
alt to withdraw from the scheme as they had to pay back their
and lacked the capital to invest in other crops. This general
stration among the smallholders is quite manifest in the following
tstudy.
Case no. 2. A Participant in the New Scheme
This participant is one of the many ex-CDC workers who joined
Öie scheme. He is 45'years old and hails from Menchum Division in
the North West Province. He was employed as a rubber tapper on
several CDC estates for fifteen years. In 1978 hè decided to resign
from the CDC and join the new scheme. He acquired 2 ha of land
from the Chief of Malende and started to develop a rubber farm.
l See Report of the Manager Smallholders1 Development Scheme, Tiko, to the Chief
* t Economie Division for the South West Province, dated 6 October 1980, in: file
TVED/SWP/A/554, Small Palm Kolders Scheme.
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He had saved about FCFA 500,000 during his working career with
the CDC. The amount left after hè bought the land was not
sufficient to cover the costs of developing his rubber farm. He was
able to raise some capital for Investment from three sources: (i)
cash grants from the project management, (ii) regulär employment
as a casual worker on local cocoa and coffee farms, and (iii) a local
rotating credit association (njangï).
When hè first starled tapping in 1985, hè was immediately faced
with a drastic fall in the rubber prices. Consequently, his monthly
income never sufficed to support his family. At present hè regrets
resigning from the CDC and joining the scheme.
Following an evaluation of the scheme in 1982, the international
financiers expressed their concern that the scheme had made so little
headway during the CAMDEV n period (1978-1982)!5. Nevertheless,
they still believed in the viability of the scheme and even recommended
an expansion during the subsequent CAMDEV II Oil Palm and Rubber
Consolidation Project period (1982/83-1986/87): an additional 500 ha of
smallholder oil palms and 1,000 ha of smallholder rubber was planned
at an estimated cost of FCFA 1,159 million.
However, weather conditions in 1982-1984 impeded the planned
expansion of the scheme. Dissatisfied with the slow progress and the
deplorable state of some of the participants' farms, the newly appointed
project manager recommended a change of policy in 1985. He argued
that the scheme was more likely to progress if it concentrated on (i) the
expansion of cultivated area by the most committed participants and
"progressive" new recruits with lands adjacent to the existing farms and
(ii) the development of relatively large lands on project costs. Similar to
the "tenant purchase" schemes proposed by the 1964 Swynnerton
Report, these project lands were later to be subdivided into blocks of
maximal 5 ha and sold on credit to selected smallholders16. He then
presented a new smallholder development programme for 1985/86-
1987/88. This programme had two aims, (1) an expansion of 700 ha of
rubber, 500 ha on project account at Bdliwindi, a village located in the
Kumba-Mamfe area, and 200 ha by committed participants and
15
 See République Unie du Cameroun et Commonwealth Development Corporation,
Accord de Pret relatif ä Projet de Consolidation de CAMDEV H, Yaoundé, 22 April
1982.
16
 Sec Project Manager CDC Smallholders1 Development Scheme, Tiko, Notes for
Visiting Agents M/S Hall and Pigot, ref. no. SDT/AD/3.
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progressive new recruits, (2) an expansion of 550 ha of oil palms, 300
ha on project account at Ikata, a Bakweri village near Muyuka, and 250
ha by committed participants and progressive new recruits.
It is still too early to assess the impact of the new programme on
smallholder development. However, the history of the scheme does not
give any grounds for optimism. It is unlikely that the scheme will
rapidly expand and create a stable middle peasantry as long as the
participants are faced with land scarcity, inadequate cash grants for
their labour inputs, and, above all, low producer prices. Similar to the
participants in the "old" scheme, the "new" scheme members have
continued to protest individually and collectively against the unstable
and often rather low producer prices. In 1986, the smallholders in the
Muyuka Subdivision sent a vehement petition to the CDC General
Manager to protest against the drastic 50% cut in the producer price
during the crisis in the domestic agro-industrial oil palm sector
(Konings, 1989b). In this petition, they expressed their belief that
"...the Smallholders Development Scheme created by the
goyernment and placed under the CDC was aimed at raising the
living Standards of the peasantry in Cameroon. But the recent slash
in the price of their produce had come as a surprise ... They were
becoming victims of price cuts in agricultural produce in a country
where salaries regularly increased and the prices of other crops
increased annually with a high bonus"17.
They also demanded a price stabilization fund for rubber and
palm oil production.
Besides such collective actions, the "new" scheme members also
resorted to informal actions to protest against control and exploitation
in. the labour process: they refused to adhere strictly to the production
rules set by the management. Contrary to the scheme's regulations, a
substantial number of oil palm smallholders decided to grow food crops
on their oil palm farms, with a view to compensating themselves for the
depletion of their capital reserves. Such practices are difficult for
management to control. In 1985 the project manager complained:
17
 For the Petition of the Smallholders 'Farmers' Association, Muyuka Subdivision
see Cameroon Outlook, 28 June 1986.
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"Eighty-four ha of palms were planted in 1984/85. Although it was
stipulated at the outset that no intercropping would be allowed and
the leguminous cover crops must be established, in many cases this
was not done by the farmers of whom it had not been previously
required. The only sanctions left were to (i) withhold delivery of
planting material and (ii) withhold the payment of cash grants. If
pahn seedlings were not delivered, there was the risk that the
project would be left with substantial quantity of such seedlings in
the nursery and in consequence it was decided to go ahead with the
planting and to withhold the payment of cash grants until these two
conditions had been met"18.
In addition, they tended to neglect their farms and, in a few cases,
to withdraw from the scheme. The 1983 CDC Annual Report noted that
the unstable and low rubber prices had lowered the maintenance
Standards and the estimated production target by 164 metric tonnes
(48.1%).
They also tried to evade the terms of exchange imposed by the
corporation, particularly by selling on the market so as to realize a
higher return on labour. Rubber growers are more locked into the
exchange relation than oil palm growers as they lack processing and
marketing facilities.
Rendell (1976: 219) rightly observed (hat informal protest actiom
are more likely to occur if smallholders are not fully dependent on thei
income from scheme participation. He notes that the tea contra^rf
farming schemes created by the Commonwealth Developir
Corporation in Uganda and Malawi performed below expectatic
because the growing of other cash crops made the smallholders l«
dependent on tea as a source of income, presumably less committed tol
during periods of low prices, and less willing to subordinate themseliw
to management authority and discipline in the labour process.
relative failure of the CDC smallholders1 scheme should also be pi
attributed to the fact that scheme participants had additional sources i
income; most of them also produced other cash crops, including eöU
and coffee. Therefore, they feit less hesitant to engage in infot
protest actions.
18 See note 16.
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Conclusion
Contract farming schemes associated with agro-industrial
enterprises have been of a more limited scope in Cameroon than in
several other Third World countries, and largely unsuccessful. The
Cameroonian experience with contract farming therefore poses an
interesting challenge to modernization theorists who have tried to
impress upon Third World governments that an expansion of contract
farming schemes might boost peasant productivity and living Standards.
Our evaluation of the CDC smallholders' schemes provided some of the
principal reasons for the rather limited and unsuccessful experience
with contract farming in Cameroon.
Firstly, there is the rather ambiguous attitude of the government
and CDC management towards smallholder development. In its policy
statements, the government has regularly expressed its firm
commitment to the agro-industrial "encadrement" of the local
peasantry19. In practice, however, it has been more interested in the
expansion of agro-industrial estates and middle-sized plantations, mainly
for the opportunities this modernization strategy offers the political elite
for private capital accumulation. lts ambiguous attitude towards
smallholder development may have been reinforced by the relative
failure of the few contract farming schemes that were implemented
ander pressure from the international financiers of agro-industrial
expansion, particularly the World Bank. However, this failure should
t be attributed to the local peasantry's "inherent traditionalism", lack
entrepreneurship, or even unwillingness to join the scheme, but
sr to the serious problems the participants faced since the start of
ntract farming schemes. In the absence of any consistent smallholder
y, the CDC management was reluctant to continue to assist
lolders' schemes. It tried to remain faithful to its "historical
sion" of estate development and tq look upon smallholder
topment as a matter of secondary importance. And, there was never
of a reason to change its priorities. The government seemed to
e, for instance, République du Cameroun, VIe Plan Quinquennal de
, jppement Economique, Social et Culturel, 1986-1991, Yaoundé: Ministère du
ï| «de l'Aménagement du Territoire, 1986.
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support its smallholder and price policies. In addition, the corporation
never became dependent on the supply of smallholder produce, which
continued to account for only a tiny part of the total CDC output: in
1971-1987 the CDC smallholder rubber and palm oil output rose
respectively from 0.8% to 1.8% and from 0.6% to 6.1% of the total
output2».
Secondly, as dependencia-theorists have correctly observed, there
is the precarious dependence on commodity prices on the domestic and
international markets. The banana scheme flourished in the days before
independence, mainly because of a United Kingdom trade preference
for the agricultural commodities of Commonwealth countries. After
independence and reunification, this preferential treatment was
withdrawn and the scheme collapsed (cf. Epale, 1985: 190-191). Unlike
the banana scheme, the rubber and oil palm schemes never experienced
a real "boom" period, as they were immediately subject to the
fluctuating and often rather low prices on the international market.
Thirdly, there is the problem of establishing control over the
schemes. Feeling exploited, the participants opposed managerial efforts
to gain control over production and exchange. They regularly engaged
in a variety of collective and informal modes of resistance, which
seriously impeded the progress of the schemes. These forms of protest,
largely ignored by modemization and dependencia theorists, illustrated
the common struggle against the low producer price offered by the
corporation, the defiance against management authority over the labour
process reflected in the persistent violation of the production rules and
the refusal to maintain farms, and the withdrawal from the relations of
exchange and, in the last instance, from the scheme itself.
It is interesting to note that there is some evidence of a possible
policy change on contract farming schemes in Cameroon. In 1987
Unilever decided to withdraw from plantation production in South West
Cameroon because of the serious crisis in the domestic agro-industrial
sector, and to put its subsidiary, the Plantations Pamol du Cameroun
Ltd, into voluntary liquidation (Konings, 1989b). The liquidator of the
Company, Mr C.G. Mure, decided to drastically re-organise the
Company before selling it to the highest private bidder. In 1989 hè
announced that the Company would gradually shift from estate
20
 CDC Annual Reports and Accounts, 1971-1987.
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production to smallholder production: not less than 60% of the
company's future production was to be based on smallholder
production. A special Smallholder Unit was to be created within the
corporation which would render every possible assistance to the
scheme's participants. Producer prices were to be increased and
smallholders would be entitled to own shares in the Company and to be
represented on the Board of Directors. It remains to be seen how the
company's neighbour, the CDC, will react to this drastic change in
agro-industrial production.
